26.11.2024, 17:30 (EET)
Nataliya Toteva (Sofia University) - Clarifying the relationship between deep brain stimulation and identity over time
Venue: Sofia University, Rectorate Building, Room 63 (South Wing)
Abstract: The current paper discusses the challenges deep brain stimulation (DBS) poses to identity over time. It has been argued that in some cases, DBS can disrupt psychological continuity and thus diachronic identity (Klaming & Haselager, 2013; Roskies, 2024). Whether or not this occurs
depends on the specific theory of personal identity being applied, with animalism and a simplified version of the brain view implying that personal identity would remain intact during DBS treatment.
DBS is a known treatment of symptoms of movement disorders, (such as Parkinson’s disease and dystonia) that has also been administered in some mental illnesses (e.g. obsessive-compulsive disorder) (Krauss et al., 2021). It is a promising tool for managing other
neurological and psychiatric disorders, including but not limited to Alzheimer's, Tourette's syndrome, and schizophrenia. In DBS, the implantation of long electrodes into the brain's nucleus allows the treatment of unwanted symptoms through electrical impulses. A „brain pacemaker“ that controls the simulations is placed into the body and operated by an external device. This device can be switched on and off (Decker & Fleischer, 2008).
It has been reported that this treatment can cause mania, depression, dissociation, hypersexual behavior, and personality changes (Klaming & Haselager, 2013; Roskies, 2024). These changes raise important questions regarding consent and legal and moral responsibility. Specific instances of the potential side effects of DBS include a patient who faced the dilemma of being catatonic from Parkinson’s disease or manic due to DBS (Roskies, 2024) and another patient who experienced dissociation but returned to their normal self after reducing the amplitude of DBS stimulation, having no recollection of the experience or associated behaviors (Klaming & Haselager, 2013). Other cases also suggest disruptions in psychological continuity.
I aim to assess the claim that DBS treatment disrupts psychological continuity and the separate claim that DBS disrupts identity over time. My evaluation will involve two main steps: 1) distinguishing between personality, personal identity, and identity over time, and 2) establishing the most relevant criteria for identity over time in the context of neural implants.
Abstract: The current paper discusses the challenges deep brain stimulation (DBS) poses to identity over time. It has been argued that in some cases, DBS can disrupt psychological continuity and thus diachronic identity (Klaming & Haselager, 2013; Roskies, 2024). Whether or not this occurs
depends on the specific theory of personal identity being applied, with animalism and a simplified version of the brain view implying that personal identity would remain intact during DBS treatment.
DBS is a known treatment of symptoms of movement disorders, (such as Parkinson’s disease and dystonia) that has also been administered in some mental illnesses (e.g. obsessive-compulsive disorder) (Krauss et al., 2021). It is a promising tool for managing other
neurological and psychiatric disorders, including but not limited to Alzheimer's, Tourette's syndrome, and schizophrenia. In DBS, the implantation of long electrodes into the brain's nucleus allows the treatment of unwanted symptoms through electrical impulses. A „brain pacemaker“ that controls the simulations is placed into the body and operated by an external device. This device can be switched on and off (Decker & Fleischer, 2008).
It has been reported that this treatment can cause mania, depression, dissociation, hypersexual behavior, and personality changes (Klaming & Haselager, 2013; Roskies, 2024). These changes raise important questions regarding consent and legal and moral responsibility. Specific instances of the potential side effects of DBS include a patient who faced the dilemma of being catatonic from Parkinson’s disease or manic due to DBS (Roskies, 2024) and another patient who experienced dissociation but returned to their normal self after reducing the amplitude of DBS stimulation, having no recollection of the experience or associated behaviors (Klaming & Haselager, 2013). Other cases also suggest disruptions in psychological continuity.
I aim to assess the claim that DBS treatment disrupts psychological continuity and the separate claim that DBS disrupts identity over time. My evaluation will involve two main steps: 1) distinguishing between personality, personal identity, and identity over time, and 2) establishing the most relevant criteria for identity over time in the context of neural implants.
